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Notes
Inequitable Disqualification from Unemployment
Insurance in Minnesota
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota legislature, upon enactment of the state's
first unemployment insurance law in 1936, explicitly recognized
the economic and social problems precipitated by unemployment
and the interest of the state in arresting its spread and buffering
its immediate effects. The preamble to the act reads:
[T]he public good and the general welfare of the citizens of
this state will be promoted by providing ... for the com-
pulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for
the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.1
In the 34 years since the promulgation of this legislation, the
enactment of several disqualification provisions has altered the
thrust of the statute. The effect of the present disqualification
provisions is to punish unduly the behavior of certain claimants
who contribute to their own unemployment and to deny all
benefits to others who are unemployed through no fault of their
own. These results should be avoided by any scheme of unem-
ployment insurance.
This Note will examine the problems raised by the various
disqualification provisions in terms of traditional insurance con-
cepts and social policy. Suggestions for a more equitable unem-
ployment insurance scheme for Minnesota will be made.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL
Despite its name, unemployment insurance is not precisely
an insurance program. Rather, it is a type of social welfare
legislation financed by a payroll tax imposed on employers.
The rate of this tax depends upon the employer's experience
with the fund.2  Under the Minnesota law, each time the em-
ployer is responsible for the involuntary unemployment of a
claimant, the benefits paid are charged to his account. When
1. MAN. STAT. § 268.03 (1967) (emphasis added). The original
appeared in ch. 2, § 1 [1936] Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
2. The Minnesota Employment Security Law, like other unem-
ployment laws, operates on the basis of an experience rating for em-
ployers. MnqN. STAT. ANN. § 268.06 (6), (8) (Supp. 1970).
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the unemployment is considered to be voluntary or due to mis-
conduct on the part of the claimant or when neither claimant
nor employer is responsible, the employer is not charged. It is
therefore in the employer's interest to keep charges at a mini-
mum.
Unlike most welfare programs, however, unemployment in-
surance does not operate on a principle of need.3 Only those per-
sons with a prior employment history have the requisite base
period upon which unemployment insurance benefits can be com-
puted. Coverage under the Minnesota law is limited to indi-
viduals who earned $30 or more during at least 18 weeks of the
52 calendar week period immediately preceding the date of the
claim. 4 These 52 weeks are appropriately called the claimant's
base period.5 The claimant's unemployment insurance is deter-
mined by two factors. The weekly benefit amount is equal to
one half of the average weekly base period wage up to $114 per
week, or a maximum weekly benefit amount of $57 per week.0
The total number of weeks that the claimant can collect, or the
duration of the claim, is equal to 70 percent of the number of
weeks during the base period in which the claimant earned $30
or more (credit weeks).7 In no case, however, will duration ex-
ceed 26 weeks.8 The total benefit amount is the product of the
weekly benefit amount and the duration.
When the claimant files a valid claim, a benefit year is es-
tablished. This is the 52 calendar week period following the
filing of a valid claim 9 and is the administrative period of his
claim. He cannot file a new claim during the benefit year unless
3. This is not to say that these people may not be in need-they
very often are. The point is that public assistance programs are de-
signed to provide financial aid solely on z. need basis. Unemployment
insurance is something one gets not by need but by being an involun-
tarily unemployed member of the work force. It is much like the man
who insures his garage against fire; if it burns down he collects on the
policy regardless of his financial need. The factor, it has been said, that
most clearly distinguishes social insurance from public assistance is the
absence of a need requirement in the former. See W. HT & M. MuR-
RAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AxiacAN ECONO1MY 43 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as HABER & MUmRAY].
4. MnvN. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.04(29), 268.07(2) (Supp. 1970).
5. Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 268.04(2) (Supp. 1970).
6. MN. STAT. ANN. § 268.07(2) (1) (Supp. 1970). For a defini-
tion of average weekly wage see MInm. STAT. ANN. § 268.04(30) (Supp.
1970).
7. MImN. STAT. ANN. § 268.04(29) (Supp. 1970).
8. MTiw. STAT. ANN. § 268.07 (2) (2) (Supp. 1970).
9. AM-N. STAT. ANN. § 268.04(4) (Supp. 1970).
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the claim establishing the benefit year is invalidated.10 If the
claimant exhausts his total benefit amount or duration" before
the end of the benefit year, he cannot file a new claim until the
benefit year expires.' 2  Thus, an individual just entering the
work force is unable to qualify regardless of financial need.
Moreover, not all persons having the requisite work history can
qualify for benefits, since two additional conditions must be met.
First, the worker must be unemployed involuntarily and through
no fault of his own. Secondly, although unemployed, he must
remain an active member of the work force. Two types of stat-
utory controls seek to insure that recipients fulfill these require-
ments.
Disqualification provisions suspend benefits if the claimant's
separation from employment was either voluntary and without
good cause or was precipitated by the claimant's misconduct."
Two justifications are given for disqualification provisions. The
first is that they are theoretically consistent with the insurance
concept of real risk. Insurance policies are written to cover only
risks which are always present and the occurrence of which can
only result in unfortunate consequences.' 4 Coverage is excluded
for certainties and created risks. In unemployment insurance,
quitting is analogous to certainty since the insured event is al-
ways within the power of the beneficiary. Similarly, misconduct
is analogous to created risk. The second and more significant
justification is founded on public policy. It seems unfair to re-
10. In the event that the original claim was invalidated, any sub-
sequent claim would have its own base period of 52 weeks preceding
and its own benefit year of 52 weeks following the date of the new claim.
11. It is possible for a claimant to reach the duration of his claim
without exhausting the total benefit amount. Ordinarily this results
when there is a week of partial unemployment and the claimant has his
weekly benefit amount reduced by whatever he earned in excess of $12
during the week. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.07 (2) (4) (Supp. 1970).
12. If the claimant files a "transitional claim"-a new claim filed
immediately upon the expiration of a benefit year-the benefit year will
become the base period for a new claim. The validity and extent of
the transitional claim will depend upon the work history during this
period of time. If the claimant was unemployed during the entire pre-
ceding benefit year or did not earn at least $30 in 18 weeks of it, he will
not have a valid claim and hence will not be entitled to unemployment
insurance.
13. The Minnesota provision which covers voluntary leaving of
employment without good cause and discharge as the result of miscon-
duct (which is considered a form of voluntary unemployment, see text
accompanying notes 26-30 infra) is found in MIqN. STAT. ANN. §
268.09 (1) (1) (Supp. 1970).
14. R. RITGOEL & J. MILLER, INSURAN cE PRNcnLEs AM PRACTICES
21-22 (5th ed. 1966).
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quire the employer to pay for unemployment which is neither
fortuitous nor the employer's fault but is instead brought about
about by the actions of the beneficiary.
Eligibility provisions, unlike disqualification provisions, do
not deal with acts which create or extend unemployment, but
rather are concerned with assuring that claimants remain a part
of the work force. Even though employment insurance is not
geared to need, it is, like any insurance program, designed to al-
leviate economic loss caused by the event insured against.1 If
the claimant would not be working anyway, his unemployment
is not creating any financial loss and no reason exists to pay
benefits. Generally, eligibility provisions take the form of an
"able and available" test.16 If the claimant is unable to work
because of an illness or personal emergency or is unavailable for
work because of a temporary vacation or the like, benefits are
denied for each day the condition exists. The same test is ap-
plied where the claimant by his actions does not appear to be a
member of the work force, as where he refuses to accept referrals
for available jobs or places unreasonable limitations on his em-
ployability. The latter is typically demanding a wage in excess
of that currently offered for workers with the claimant's training
and experience.
B. LENGTH OF DISQUALIFICATION
The extent to which benefits should be denied under dis-
qualification provisions has been the subject of much dispute.
One view is that an unlimited disqualification is most consistent
with the concept of insuring only involuntary unemployment.
It states that an individual who by his own action initiates his
unemployment should be denied benefits for the entire duration
of that period of unemployment. 17 While this is consistent with
the real risk requirement, it is arguable that claimants do not
anticipate creating the risk of long term unemployment.
It is this unpredictable nature of unemployment which sup-
ports the second approach-limited disqualification providing for
payment of benefits after a fixed period of time. It presumes
that unemployment for an unreasonable period of time is due
15. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 38.
16. The Minnesota law provides that those who are not available or
able to work will be disqualified from receiving benefits for any day
in which that condition occurred. MlnN. STAT. ANN. § 268.08(1)
(Supp. 1970).
17. HABER & MuRRAy, supra note 3, at 302-04.
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to economic factors beyond the claimant's control. Thus, after
a period of time in which the unemployed individual making a
reasonable effort would have obtained employment, the unem-
ployment is transformed from voluntary to involuntary.'8 The
justification for this view lies in the fact that it is not the nature
of the initial act but the nature of the unemployment which is
being insured against. Although in a strict sense the real risk
requirement is not met, this approach is a reasonable compromise
with the social policy underlying the law.19 Minnesota in its
unemployment insurance program has adopted a scheme close
to this approach.20
C. PENALTIES
Regardless of the length of disqualification, "the principles
applicable to control of the risk do not, normally, permit the
operation of anything that can be classified as a penalty or for-
feiture, as such."21 A penalty is a provision which as a result
of some claimant action adversely affects the claimant's right to
benefits without regard to the relationship between the proscrip-
tion and the risk insured. In the context of unemployment in-
surance, penalties are subject to two criticisms. First, punish-
ment should not be a function of an insurance plan, but rather a
function of criminal law if the misconduct is serious enough.
22
Secondly, penalties focus on regulating the conduct itself rather
than the conduct's relationship to the risk of unemployment.
23
The behavior should be considered undesirable only insofar as it
creates a condition of unemployment. The intrinsic "goodness"
or "badness" of the act should not be relevant per se.
A provision which provides for forfeiture of all future bene-
fits in the event a claimant loses his job as a result of misconduct
18. Id. at 302.
19. Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this
state .... [It] is therefore a subject of general interest and con-
cern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to pre-
vent its spread and lighten its burdens. This can be ... [done]
by the systematic accumulation of funds . . . to provide benefits
. .. thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious
social consequences of poor relief assistance.
Minnesota Employment Security Law-Declaration of Public Policy.
Mne. STAT. § 268.03 (1967).
20. Mum. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (Supp. 1970).
21. Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAI.
L. REv. 307, 313 (1955).
22. HABER & MURRAY, supra note 3, at 305.
23. Sanders, supra note 21, at 314.
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would operate as a penalty. The worker could be deprived of
benefits at some later time when his unemployment is not the
result of misconduct. Attempts to iaclude penalty clauses in
private insurance contracts have been condemned, and for the
most part, controlled by legislatures and courts. 24
Unfortunately, the disqualification provisions25 of Minne-
sota's unemployment insurance law frequently penalize individ-
uals. The provisions operate as penalties in three different ways.
First, they may operate to provide for the suspension of the
claimant's benefits for varying periods of time without regard to
the relationship between the penalty and the risk insured. Sec-
ond, they reduce the total benefit amount for specified activity
by the claimant, thereby raising the possibility that benefits will
not be available at a time when the claimant is otherwise legiti-
mately eligible to receive them. Finally, there is provision for
cancellation of wage credits. This provision is not related to
risk of unemployment at all; it is designed purely to punish the
claimant for past activity. The manner in which these penalties
operate will become clearer as the specific provisions in which
they are contained are examined in more detail.
Ill. MISCONDUCT-GROSS MISCONDUCT
The disqualification provision for simple misconduct in Minne-
sota provides five to eight weeks' disqualification, plus reduction
of total benefits by an amount equal to the number of weeks dis-
qualified multiplied by the weekly benefit amount.26 For gross
24. W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE 417, 419-22, 426 (3d ed. 1951);
E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE L&w 296-97, 350-377 (2d. ed.
1957). See Sanders, supra note 21, at 313.
25. Disqualification is used here in a generic sense. It refers to all
provisions contained in Minu. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (Supp. 1970). This
is to be distinguished from a specific control device contained in that
section which provides for suspension of benefits for specified amounts
of time for various activity by the claimant.
26. Any disqualification for voluntary leaving results in a reduction
of the maximum benefits available to the disqualified claimant in an
amount equal to two times the weekly benefit amount. M.1NN. STAT.
ANN. § 268.09(1) (b) (Supp. 1970). If the claimant is discharged for
misconduct, the reduction is equal to the number of weeks disqualified
times the weekly benefit amount. This would operate as follows:
assuming the disqualified claimant is entitled to $40 a week for 21
weeks, he would receive a maximum benefit amount of 21 times $40
or $840. The benefit reduction provision, assuming the claimant quit
his job, reduces this by 2 times $40, or $80, from $840 is $760. If the
claimant is unemployed for a long period of time and collects full
benefits each week, a reduction of two weeks in the duration of his claim
has in effect resulted. Instead of enough total benefits available to pay
1324 [Vol. 54:1319
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misconduct the entire benefit year may be cancelled.27 The basis
for the provision is that the claimant has performed an act which
he should have known would lead to termination of his employ-
ment.28 Unemployment due to misconduct is therefore consid-
ered "voluntary" rather than involuntary.
It is this voluntary creation of risk that the variable dis-
qualification for misconduct is designed to control. The period
of time is not related to the gravity of the separation act per se
but rather represents the length of time an individual separated
under the circumstances in question would normally be unem-
ployed.2 9 Unemployment which extends beyond this period is
assumed due to economic circumstances beyond the claimant's
control and not to the act of separation. 30 The gravity of the
act is relevant only insofar as it relates to the claimant's diffi-
culty in obtaining a new job and thereby affects his expected
period of unemployment.
The benefit reduction provision for misconduct and the dis-
tinction between ordinary misconduct and gross misconduct,
however, indicates that the Minnesota law is more concerned
with the gravity of the act per se than with the effect of the
act on the claimant's anticipated duration of unemployment.
The fact that the benefit reduction for misconduct varies directly
with the length of the disqualification merely emphasizes the
penal intent of the provision. The distinction between gross
misconduct and ordinary misconduct frequently arises in the
context of theft and rests solely on the distinction between petit
and grand theft.31
The Minnesota misconduct provisions should be changed to
provide a limited disqualification of fixed length. In the event
$40 for 21 weeks, there is enough for only 19 weeks. If the claimant
had been discharged for misconduct, the reduction would have been
five to eight times $40 depending upon how long a disqualification was
imposed.
27. The gross misconduct provisions also provide for lesser penal-
ties of 12 weeks disqualification with 12 weeks benefit reduction or
partial or total cancellation of wage credits.
28. See Sanders, supra note 21, at 334-35.
29. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
30. Id.
31. As described to the author by the Chief of Benefits of the Min-
nesota Dept. of Manpower Services, the issue will often turn on
whether the value of the stolen article is to be determined by the em-
ployer's purchase cost as opposed to market retail value or replacement
cost. It is self evident that a prospective employer is not going to be
any less reluctant to hire an individual merely because by chance he
stole an article that had a replacement value of $99.98 rather than $100.02.
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that a variable disqualification is retained, the variability should
be related to legitimate objectives of an unemployment insur-
ance scheme. For instance, the claimant's ordinary occupation
would seem to be more relevant to the length of disqualifica-
tion than the nature of his separation act.
IV. VOLUNTARY LEAVING
Claimants who leave their job voluntarily are subject to the
same variable, five to eight week disqualification which appears
in the ordinary misconduct provision.3 2 The benefit reduction
provision which applies to voluntary leaving, however, reduces
the total benefit by twice the week.y benefit amount rather
than making the reduction dependent upon the length of dis-
qualification.3 3
In Minnesota, claimants who quit for compelling personal
reasons are subject to the voluntary leaving disqualification.
Benefits are paid only to those who quit for good cause. The
present test of good cause is whether the reason for leaving was
attributable to the employer.3 4 Claimants who quit their jobs for
compelling personal cause should not be disqualified. Theoreti-
cally, involuntary would seem to incorporate those actions
spawned by unforeseen personal or family emergencies. More-
over, as a matter of policy, it is desirable to assist persons who re-
main attached to the labor market. Minnesota's law currently
provides for illness as the sole case of compelling personal
cause.35 A generalized provision could operate in the same way
-that is, the claimant would not be disqualified from receiving
benefits if otherwise eligible and the employer from whom the
separation occurred would not be charged for benefits paid. The
length of the period of disqualification should hinge upon the
same considerations that apply for misconduct.
Thus far, disqualifications have been attacked because their
variability is unrelated to the risk insured. However, in the next
two provisions it will become apparent that even the classic
indefinite disqualification can penalize if it operates overbroadly
to subsume some legitimate cases of involuntary unemployment.
V. LEAVING TO ACCOMPANY SPOUSE
Under the Minnesota law any separation by a wife to assume
32. MN. ST&T. Azm. § 268.09 (1) (1) (Supp. 1970).
33. See note 26 supra.
34. MN . STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (1) (1) (Supp. 1970).
35. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (1) (1) (C) (Supp. 1970).
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family obligations results in her unlimited disqualification.3" If
the separation is due to pregnancy or to performing the duties
of a housewife, other interests and obligations have apparently
supplanted her desire for employment and withdrawal from the
labor market can be reasonably presumed. This situation should
be noncompensable since it violates both the principle of eco-
nomic loss3 7 and that of pure risk.38  On the other hand, quitting
to move to a new location with her spouse does not raise the
same presumptions, since there is no indication of removal from
the labor market.39 Properly analyzed, this is really a special
case of the compelling personal cause situation. Therefore, this
form of separation should be incorporated into a provision which
exempts compelling personal cause from disqualification. Upon
arrival at the new location, the wife should be allowed to collect
benefits subject to the same conditions as all other individuals
who have good cause for leaving their jobs. 40 If such a provision
is not adopted, the situation should be treated as an ordinary,
voluntary-leaving separation 41 which it resembles more closely
36. MmN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (1) (2) (Supp. 1970).
37. A woman who leaves the labor force to become a housewife
would not be generating any income while staying at home and per-
forming her domestic duties. Therefore by being unemployed she is not
losing any income she would otherwise have received. See text accom-
panying note 15 supra.
38. A pure risk is one which is constantly in existence (e.g., the
threat of fire, tornado, death, illness) and can result only in a loss. In
unemployment insurance, only the pure risks surrounding unemployment
are insured against. These include job loss due to illness, economic re-
cession, employer failure and generally those unemployment-producing
circumstances over which the worker has no control. A decision to quit
in order to assume the duties of a housewife does not fit this test. It is
like any other voluntary decision to leave a job. See text accompany-
ing notes 14 & 15 supra.
39. Out of 38 statutes that disqualify specially for quitting due to
pregnancy, 19 of them (Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin) do not extend
it to unemployment due to marital obligations. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANcE LAWS ET-13 (Bes
No. U-141, 1965).
40. Arkansas provides that when a woman leaves a job to ac-
company her husband to a new home and immediately upon arrival
enters the labor market and makes an effort to secure work, she will
be eligible for benefits. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106(e)(1) (1960).
Hawaii will pay benefits again as soon as the woman registers for work
and presents evidence of availability. HAWAI REv. STAT. § 383-29
(1968).
41. Out of 50 states and the District of Columbia, 28 treat unem-
ployment due to marital obligations as a voluntary leaving issue.
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than quitting due to pregnancy or to assume the duties of a
housewife.
Reasons have also been advanced for eliminating the distinc-
tion between men and women under the leaving-to-accompany-
spouse disqualification.42 First is the theoretical argument that
an insurance program should not inquire into sex but rather
compensate wage loss for all those who meet the risk criteria. 43
Second, there is increasing evidence that married women work
out of necessity, not just to supply the household with extras.
Thus, the same evils flow from their unemployment as flow
from that of the male breadwinners. Third, the country needs
the skills that women bring to the labor market and they there-
fore should be given equal treatment to encourage them to stay
in the labor market.44
VI. LABOR DISPUTE
Minnesota is one of only nine states45 that provide a blanket
disqualification of all individuals who lose their jobs as a result
of a labor dispute.46 Any such individual is disqualified for the
period of time during which the labor dispute is in progress at
his place of employment.47  The underlying theory is that the
42. Note that although Minnesota's law imposes an indefinite dis-
qualification on the woman who leaves her job to accompany her
husband to a new residence, it treats a husband's quitting to move with
his wife as an ordinary voluntary leaving. En the one administrative de-
cision obtainable by the author the minimum disqualification was im-
posed. Minnesota Dept. of Manpower Services Appeals Tribunal decision
1256-B-68 (1968).
43. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently upheld the constitu-
tionality of the disqualification imposed upon a woman who left her job
to move with her husband to a new home. Kantor v. Honeywell,-Minn.
-- N.W.2d-(1970). However, the move was made for the purpose
of self-employment in which the wife participated. The nature of em-
ployment was the running of a resort and the wife filed her claim only
when the resort season ended. This situation is arguably more appro-
priately treated as quitting to assume domestic responsibilities than as
quitting to accompany spouse to a new locat.on.
44. HABER & MuRRAY, supra note 3, at 274-75.
45. The others are, ALA. CODE tit. 26,, § 214(A) (Supp. 1967);
CAL. UNEv. INS. CODE § 1262 (West 1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,§ 3315(4) (1953); KY. REV. STAT. § 341.360 (1962); N.Y. LABOR LAW
§ 593(2)(b) (McKinney 1965); N.C. Gm. STAT. § 96-14(5) (Supp.
1969); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Supp. 1969); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 108.04(10) (Supp. 1969).
46. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (1) (5) (Supp. 1970).
47. Id. The test for determining establishment was set out by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68,
42 N.W.2d 576 (1950). The decision as to whether a plant is an estab-
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state should remain neutral in labor disputes, giving aid to neither
worker nor employer.48 This policy alone, however, does not
compel blanket disqualification. In fact, the provision arose out
of the fear that payments in a trade or labor dispute would consti-
tute such a drain on funds that they would be insufficient to meet
benefits for other claimants.49
Although the blanket provision does insure neutrality of the
state in a labor dispute, it also operates to deny benefits to some
nonstriking individuals, as illustrated by the following example.
Assume that a strike by members of a production workers'
craft union in a manufacturing concern forces a shutdown in
production. A short time later, as a result of the production
halt, a typist who is not a member of the striking union is laid
off in the billing department because of lack of work. This
typist meets all the tests of involuntary unemployment since
she took no action which could have been reasonably expected
to cause termination of her employment. Moreover, not being
a member of the union involved, she has no guarantee of benefits
or of being recalled to work upon a resolution of the strike.
Nevertheless, she is disqualified from receiving benefits during
the active course of the labor dispute. 0
The result seems inconsistent with the provision which al-
lows benefits to all claimants who are unemployed due to an
employer-initiated lockout.51 In violation of the state neutral-
ity principle, recognition is made of the involuntary nature of a
lockout. It is not readily apparent why the same recognition
lishment for purposes of the labor dispute provision is made by:
determining from all the facts available whether the unit under
consideration is a separate establishment from the standpoint
of employment and not whether it is a single enterprise from
the standpoint of management or for the more efficient produc-
tion of goods.
Id. at 89, 42 N.W.2d at 588.
For application to various fact situations examine: Easthagen v.
Naugle-Leck, Inc., 260 Minn. 198, 109 N.W.2d 556 (1961); Weiss v. Klein
Super Markets, Inc., 259 Minn. 502, 108 N.W.2d 4 (1961). But see
Koll v. Egekvist Bakeries, Inc., 259 Minn. 287, 107 N.W.2d 373 (1961).
48. M. HUGHES, PRmcIPLEs UNDERLYING LABoR-DisPuTE DISQUALI-
FicATION 1 (1946) [hereinafter cited as HurHES].
49. Id.
50. Per conversation with Chief of Benefits, Minnesota Dept. of
Manpower Services. However, once the dispute was settled she would
be able to collect unemployment compensation if she were not immedi-
ately re-employed. Ayers v. Nichols, 244 Minn. 375, 70 N.W.2d 296
(1955).
51. MINN. STAT. ANx. § 268.09 (Supp. 1970); Capra v. Carpenter
Paper Co., 258 Minn. 456, 104 N.W.2d 532 (1960); Bucko v. J.F. Quest
Foundary Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W.2d 223 (1949).
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should not be given to individuals who are laid off as a result
of a labor dispute but who neither participate in the dispute nor
have an interest in its outcome.
This disparity has been recognized by 41 states, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, which provide some form of relief
clause for certain groups affected by a labor dispute.52  The
relief provisions take into account three factors-participation,
financing and direct interest.53 Benefits will be paid if neither
the claimant nor any member of a grade or class of workers to
which the claimant belongs, who we:re employed at the strike
premises immediately before the stoppage, participates, finances
or is directly interested in the outcome of the dispute. 54 The
two most important factors are participation and direct interest.
The former is important for the obvious reason that payment of
benefits to an active striker would be state subsidization of the
worker's interest in a labor dispute. Direct interest is important
because the payment of benefits to a group directly interested in
the outcome of a labor dispute will give tacit support to the side
with which its interest lies, resulting in state subsidization of
one party's interests.55
Financing does not seem to be crucial. Any aid given by a
claimant will likely be in the form of union dues and the indi-
vidual is then almost always participating or directly interested.
The only other context would be where shutdown in one plant
would precipitate layoff in another due to the plants' interrela-
tion. In this case, however, the strike would not be at the second
plant and therefore the labor dispute provisions would not
apply to individuals laid off there.56
VII. REFUSAL OF RE-EMPLOYMENT
The previous sections have dealt with the problem of dis-
qualifications and benefit reduction and how they operate sep-
arately and together to penalize claimants. Although the re-
52. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPAIUSON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INsURANcE LAWS ET-11 (Bes No. U-141, 1965). Minnesota in its first
Unemployment Compensation Act, provided relief for those not par-
ticipating in the dispute or financing one side, ch. 2, § 1 [1936] Minn.
Laws Ex. Sess.
53. HUGHES, supra note 48, at 60-61.
54. Id.
55. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
56. HUGHES, supra note 48, at 67-68. This is the "establishment"
concept. Under Minnesota law a claimant is disqualified only if the
labor dispute is in progress at his establishment. See Nordling v. Ford
Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950).
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employment provision does contain a disqualification procedure,
it is for a uniform seven week period and is not subject to any
serious criticism. There is no benefit reduction as such. The
re-employment provision, however, does contain the third type
of penalty, wage credit cancellation. This is probably the most
objectionable of the penalties. It creates all the hardships of the
other two to a much greater extent.
The disqualification for refusal of re-employment in the Min-
nesota law 7 provides that all base period wage credits5s attribu-
table to any employer will be cancelled if the claimant, without
good cause, refuses an offer of suitable re-employment from that
employer. Good cause is defined as: (1) other employment, (2)
illness which precludes acceptance or (3) new residence out of
the employer's geographic area.5 9 Suitable re-employment is a
job which provides substantially the same wages, hours and con-
ditions as the claimant's former employment. 60
This disqualification fails to consider several important fac-
tors. Thus the following could result:
(1) Assume a claimant quits his job for good cause-he is
either discharged for reasons other than misconduct or
voluntarily quits because of culpable behavior on the part of his
employer. Assume his employer later offers the claimant his
old job back and the claimant refuses the offer. Despite the orig-
inal separation for good cause, this situation does not fit within
one of the statutorily specified categories of good cause. Thus,
the claimant's employer could avoid charges by obtaining cancel-
lation of the claimant's wage credits.6' If this employer was the
claimant's sole base period employer, the claimant's entire claim
57. M.mx. STAT. ANN. § 268.09(1) (6) (Supp. 1970).
58. Id. It is apparent that cancellation of wage credits may sub-
stantially reduce either the amount received by the claimant or the
length of time he can potentially collect, or both. If the employer can-
celled was the claimant's primary employer during his base period, it
could result in invalidation of the claim, since a claimant must have in
his base period at least $520 in total earnings and at least 18 weeks in
which he earned $30 or more. See text accompanying note 4 supra. It
is interesting to note that the increase in the credit week from $26 to
$30 by necessity raised the minimum amount of earning for a valid
claim from $520 to $540 (18 times $30 is $540). Apparently this escaped
the notice of the legislature. However, since both 18 credit weeks
and at least $520 in earnings is required, this is a moot point.
59. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09(1) (6) (Supp. 1970).
60. Id.
61. If there are no base period wage credits for an employer there
is no basis to charge him under MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 268.06(8) (Supp.
1970).
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will be invalid.62 Any provision in an unemployment insurance
system which in some cases provides relief for employers who, by
their own actions, create unemployment cannot be justified.
(2) Assume a claimant quits his job without good cause,
and the employer's offer of re-employment is made in good faith.
Although this is precisely the situation which the provision was
designed to encompass, the presence of the wage cancellation pro-
vision may still impose a penalty on the claimant. If the em-
ployer offering re-employment was the claimant's only base pe-
riod employer, the claim would be completely invalid. If the
claimant then obtains a new job, is subsequently laid off after
a short time and then files a claim, he may not have enough
credit weeks to establish a valid claim.63 If the employer is one
of several base period employers, the claimant may have a claim
either with a very small weekly benefit amount or of short dura-
tion, despite nearly continuous employment throughout his base
period.
Wage credit cancellation is not necessary to protect the em-
ployer's interest because where the claimant's actions initiate the
unemployment, his employer is not charged for the benefits.0 4
Although this situation is likely to arise very infrequently, the
claimant is unfairly penalized when it does.
(3) Assume a claimant accepts employment with substan-
tially better wages and working conditions than the proffered re-
employment but that the offer of re-employment is made prior to
the initial date of work on the new job. Since a claimant who
62. In a discussion with the Chief of Benefits, Minnesota Dept. of
Manpower Services the author was informed that the re-employment
provisions are interpreted and administrated literally. Even though it
seems as if the legislature never intended separations resulting from
particularly reprehensible conduct on the employer's part to be sub-
sumed by the re-employment provision, it is the author's opinion that
the provision could be interpreted in such a way that prior separation-
producing conduct by the employer offering re-employment would pre-
vent the job from being considered suitable re-employment within the
meaning of the act. Certainly when there is evidence that the re-em-
ployment is being offered solely in an attempt to obtain cancellation of
the claimant's wage credits there is no compelling reason to treat it as a
good faith offer and hence within the statute. The Minnesota agency
is in agreement but points out that intent of this nature is difficult to
prove.
63. mN. STAT. ANx. § 268.07(2) (Supp. 1970).
64. In the case of voluntary quitting without good cause, the
claimant will be disqualified for at least five weeks following the wait-
ing week. There will be no benefits to charge since none will have
been paid. Thereafter, even f benefits are paid, the employer is re-
lieved of charges.
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is neither ill nor outside the employer's geographic area must be
working at a new job for refusal to be a good cause,65 the claim-
ant would suffer cancellation of wage credits. The inequities are
glaringly apparent. The claimant is penalized for obtaining a
better job. The only alternative to the penalty is acceptance of
a less desirable job which seems to defy common sense.66
The re-employment disqualification provides relief for em-
ployers at the expense of claimants-certainly not a laudable
objective for a law which was intended to provide benefits for
those involuntarily unemployed. 67 Moreover, the employers re-
warded are sometimes those who do not deserve it, the ones
originally at fault for the claimant's unemployment.
Refusal of re-employment is in substance simply a special
case of refusal of suitable work.68 If the claimant refuses suit-
able employment with an employer other than a base period em-
ployer of the claimant, it is clearly a suitable work issue and the
claimant is disqualified for seven weeks.69 But if the refusal
is of suitable employment with a former employer, the claimant
can be denied all wage credits attributable to that employer in
addition to his seven week disqualification. Considering the
claimant to be more blameworthy in the latter circumstance
would appear to be quite irrational. The "wrongdoing" of the
claimant is his creation of a risk by refusing an offer of re-em-
65. MuN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09 (1) (5) (c) (Supp. 1970).
66. This is not an absurd hypothetical situation. The Chief of
Benefits of the Minnesota Dept. of Manpower Services indicated in a
conversation with the author that this situation has arisen and has re-
sulted in a cancellation of wage credits.
67. This special re-employment disqualification was part of the
1965 amendments, MmNI. STAT. § 268.09(1)(1) (1965). It should be
pointed out that the same amendments provided that employers who
were not at fault for a separation would still be charged for 20 percent of
the benefits paid to the claimant. MNWN. STAT. § 268.09(1) (3) (1965).
This provision was temporarily invoked because the funds available for
payment of unemployment compensation had reached a dangerously low
level. Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 885 d-2, Mar. 30, 1966. The re-employment
provision may have been a compromise to placate employers. How-
ever, on the balance, it seems a somewhat harsh remedy in light of the
adverse effect it could have on the rights of the unemployed claimant
who is, after all, the individual whom the law was intended to assist.
Nonetheless, the 20 percent charge provision was eliminated effective
on all separations occurring subsequent to Mar. 17, 1969. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 268.09(1) (3) (Supp. 1970). This removes any countervailing
policy consideration for retaining re-employment as a separate issue.
Hopefully it will be incorporated into the suitable work issue in the
near future.
68. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09(1) (4) (Supp. 1970).
69. Id.
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ployment but the nature of the risk created is exactly the same
in both circumstances. Apart from the treatment of claimants,
cancellation of the wage credits of the past employer who offers
re-employment may discriminate against the other chargeable
base period employers since their charges may thereby be in-
creased. This is best illustrated by an example: Assume X was
employed by two employers during his base period-employer
A for 20 weeks, earning $2,400; employer B for 30 weeks, earning
$4,800. Assume A and B both laid X off, so both are to be
charged for benefits paid to X. According to the statutory for-
mula,70 X is entitled to receive $57 per week in benefits for 26
weeks. Employers A and B are to be charged in proportion to
their total wages. Therefore A will be charged only $19 (one-
third of $57). If B then offers suitable re-employment and if X
refuses the offer, B's charges are cancelled. If X remains unem-
ployed after serving his seven week disqualification, X will have
a valid claim since the wages earned with A alone are sufficient
to maintain a claim. The claim is still for $57 per week but with
only 14 weeks' duration instead of 26. However, A will now be
the only base period employer and therefore he will be charged
for all of the benefits received by X. :[f any employer other than
A or B had made the offer of employment to X, benefits would
still be based on wages received from both A and B, and A would
then only be $19 per week.
The overall effect of the re-employment provision is not only
to penalize the claimant in a special case of refusal of suitable
work, but to place the power to create the special situation in
the hands of the only group who can benefit-the base period
employers. The most reasonable solution would be to eliminate
the re-employment disqualification and let it be subsumed by the
suitable work disqualification. This would provide equal treat-
ment to all of the claimant's base period employers, including
those who offer re-employment. The hiterests of base period em-
ployers would be adequately protected since they would be
charged only for benefits paid.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of disqualification provisions should be to deny
benefits to claimants who, by their own actions, have created
the risk insured against. Minnesota's disqualification provisions,
however, suffer from two major drawbacks-penalties and over-
70. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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breadth.71 The penalty aspect arises in the context of disquali-
fications for refusal of re-employment, misconduct, and volun-
tary leaving. The overbreadth provisions of the law are of two
different types-operative and theoretical. The disqualification
for refusal of re-employment operates to include fact situations
never intended by the legislature. Theoretical overbreadth is
present in the domestic and labor dispute disqualifications.
71. The purpose of the risk definition is to make sure that the
event which occurs meets the definition of the risk insured, not to set
up limitations which exclude every possible event which might not
meet the definition of the risk. The public policy considerations seem
obvious. When a law is designed to provide economic help at a critical
period of time to those individuals whose situations meet the definition
of the risk insured, a program which adopts a negative view and at-
tempts to exclude all those who do not fit the defined situations also
excludes some who are eligible. This tends to destroy the policy behind
the law which is to provide income maintainance for those eligible, not
exclude those who are not.
